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ABSTRACT
Some online advertising offers pay only when an ad elicits
a response. Randomness and uncertainty about response
rates make showing those ads a risky investment for on-
line publishers. Like financial investors, publishers can use
portfolio allocation over multiple advertising offers to pur-
sue revenue while controlling risk. Allocations over multiple
offers do not have a distinct winner and runner-up, so the
usual second-price mechanism does not apply. This paper
develops a pricing mechanism for portfolio allocations. The
mechanism is efficient, truthful, and rewards offers that re-
duce risk.
Keywords
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1. INTRODUCTION
An ad call is the opportunity to display an ad to a user on
a web page view. In online advertising auctions, publishers
sell ad calls and advertisers buy them. (For background on
online advertising auctions, refer to Varian [26, 25], Edel-
man, Ostrovsky, and Schwarz [6], and Lahaie and Pennock
[13].) Some advertisers bid for ad calls directly, but others
submit offers to pay their bid only if the ad elicits a response
from the user, such as a click or a purchase. For those of-
fers, the expected offer value is the per-response bid times
the response rate. So the auctioneer must estimate response
rates to compare offers on the basis of expected value.
When advertisers pay based on responses, their offers have
random payoffs. Since there are errors in estimating re-
sponse rates, the payoffs are also uncertain. If publishers
are risk-averse, they may choose to award their ad calls over
a portfolio of advertising offers (see Bax, Chitrapura, Garg,
and Gopalakrishnan [2]). The publisher’s role is similar to
that of an investor in financial markets: just as investors
allocate money to financial opportunities such as stocks and
bonds, publishers allocate ad calls among potentially risky
advertiser offers.
Bax, Chitrapura, Garg, and Gopalakrishnan [2] describe
how to select a portfolio of ads on behalf of a risk-averse
publisher, by applying classical mean-variance portfolio se-
lection methods. (For background on these methods, re-
fer to Markovitz [16], Lintner [15], Sharpe [21], and Tobin
[23].) In auctions for online advertising, it is common to set
the winner’s expected payment to the expected value of the
runner-up offer. (For more on second-price auctions, refer to
Krishna [12] or Milgrom [17].) Under a portfolio allocation,
there is no single winning offer and no single runner-up, so
there is no clear notion of a second price. As a result, port-
folio allocations require a different approach to pricing. As
with second-price auctions, the portfolio pricing approach
should have truth-telling as a dominant strategy. Also, in-
tuitively, it should reward buyers who reduce risk for risk-
averse sellers.
The VCG (Vickrey-Clarke-Groves) mechanism is efficient,
individually rational and incentive compatible. (For back-
ground on VCG mechanisms, refer to the original papers by
Vickrey, Clarke, and Groves [28, 29, 5, 8] or the books by
Krishna [12] and Milgrom [17].) A generalized version of
the VCG mechanism by Nisan [18] can accommodate side
conditions and decision classes beyond auctions. This paper
applies that framework to portfolio allocations, developing
a mechanism that is efficient, incentive compatible, and re-
wards buyers who reduce seller risk.
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews port-
folio allocation and the generalized VCG mechanism frame-
work. Section 3 shows how to apply that framework to port-
folio allocations. Section 4 shows that the resulting mecha-
nism has the desired properties and discusses a connection
between the mechanism and second prices. Section 5 dis-
cusses potential directions for future work.
2. BACKGROUND: PORTFOLIO ALLOCA-
TION AND GENERALIZED VCG
This section reviews two concepts underlying a VCG mecha-
nism for portfolio optimization. Subsection 2.1 reviews port-
folio allocation. Subsection 2.2 reviews VCG mechanisms.
2.1 Portfolio Allocation
In classical portfolio methods, an investor has some funds
to allocate among n investment opportunities. Let random
variables X1, X2, ....., Xn be the returns for the investment
opportunities. Let µ = (µ1, µ2, ....., µn) be the expected
returns:
∀i : µi = EXi. (1)
Let Σ be the matrix of covariances of returns:
∀i 6= j : Σij = Cov(Xi, Xj), (2)
and
∀i : Σii = V ar(Xi). (3)
Let w = (w1, w2, ....., wn) be the weights in a portfolio al-
location, with wi being the fraction of funds allocated to
investment opportunity i. Then the expected return for the
portfolio is
w
T
µ =
n∑
i=1
wiµi, (4)
and the variance of returns is
w
T
Σw. (5)
To compute a portfolio allocation, a profit-seeking but risk-
averse investor may solve
w
∗ = argmax
w
(wTµ− qwTΣw), (6)
subject to
w ≥ 0 and 1Tw = 1. (7)
(For solution methods, refer to the original paper by Wolfe
[30], the book by Franklin [7], or another text on convex
quadratic optimization techniques.) The investor selects a q
value to mediate a tradeoff between profit-seeking and risk-
aversion. For example, q = 0 expresses pure profit-seeking
and no risk aversion.
2.2 Generalized VCG Mechanism
The VCG (Vickrey-Clarke-Groves) auction mechanism charges
bidders based on the harm their participation causes other
bidders. As a result, the VCG auction mechanism is a truth-
ful mechanism, meaning that for each bidder, bidding their
true value is a dominant strategy. In addition, the VCG
mechanism is efficient, meaning that it maximizes the sum
of utilities over participants.
Because we work with portfolio allocations rather than auc-
tions, in this paper we apply a generalized version of the
VCG mechanism by Nisan [18]. In this setting, there is a
set of outcomes A and a set of participants. Each partici-
pant i submits valuations vi(a) for all outcomes a ∈ A. The
mechanism selects an outcome a∗ that maximizes the sum
of valuations:
a∗ = argmax
a∈A
∑
i
vi(a). (8)
The mechanism charges each participant i:
pi = hi(v−i)−
∑
j 6=i
vj(a
∗). (9)
where v−i = (v1, ....., vi−1, vi+1, ...., vn), and hi is a function
that depends only on the valuations of the bidders other
than bidder i.
Like the original VCG mechanism, the generalized VCG
mechanism is truthful and efficient. Informally, it is truth-
ful because the charge to each participant does not depend
on their stated valuation but rather on the harm caused to
other participants. It is efficient because it selects the out-
come that maximizes the sum of stated valuations, which are
truthful as a dominant strategy for each participant. (For
more details, refer to Nisan [18].)
3. A VCG MECHANISM FOR PORTFOLIO
ALLOCATIONS
To apply the generalized VCG mechanism to portfolio allo-
cation, consider the allocation as a process where:
1. The set of outcomes is
A = {w : wT1 = 1,w ≥ 0}. (10)
2. There are n advertising offers. Each offer is a partici-
pant submitting a valuation function
∀i ∈ 1, ....., n : vi(w) = wiµi. (11)
In other words, the advertiser issuing offer i values
their allocation linearly in the fraction of the ad calls
they receive.
3. There is an (n+1)st participant, representing the pub-
lisher’s risk aversion. This participant submits the val-
uation function
vn+1(w) = −qw
T
Σw. (12)
Then, when the general VCG mechanism selects an outcome
to maximize the sum of valuations:
a∗ = argmax
a∈A
∑
i
vi(a), (13)
it performs portfolio optimization:
w
∗ = argmax
{w:wT 1=1,w≥0}
w
T
µ− qwTΣw, (14)
where w∗ is a∗ for the portfolio setting.
When the mechanism charges each participant
pi = hi(v−i)−
∑
j 6=i
vj(a
∗), (15)
for 1 ≤ i ≤ n, use
hi(v−i) = [ max
{w:wT 1=1,w≥0,wi=0}
w
T
µ− qwTΣw]. (16)
Hence charge each of the first n participants:
pi = [ max
{w:wT 1=1,w≥0,wi=0}
w
T
µ− qwTΣw] (17)
− [w∗Tµ− qw∗TΣw∗ − w∗i µi], (18)
which is the difference between the maximum sum of valu-
ations over other participants when offer i is removed from
the system and the maximum sum of valuations over other
participants when offer i participates in the auction, sub-
mitting a valuation of wiµi. Publisher revenue is
n∑
i=1
pi. (19)
For the (n+1)st participant, who represents the publisher’s
risk aversion, let
hn+1(v−(n+1)) (20)
= [ max
{w:wT 1=1,w≥0,q=0}
w
T
µ− qwTΣw] (21)
= max
{w:wT 1=1,w≥0}
w
T
µ, (22)
removing risk-aversion from the system. Then the mecha-
nism “charges” the (n+ 1)st participant:
pn+1 = max
{w:wT 1=1,w≥0}
w
T
µ−w∗Tµ. (23)
The first term on the RHS is the expected revenue for a
risk-neutral publisher. In this case, the allocation is to the
highest bidder (or bidders if there is a tie). So:
pn+1 = max
i∈{1,.....,n}
µi −w
∗T
µ, (24)
which is the expected revenue foregone by the publisher due
to risk aversion.
Note that prices p1, ....., pn are per-allocation prices. To con-
vert to charges per ad call, divide each offer’s price by the
number of ad calls in the offer’s allocation. This per-ad call
charge applies directly to offers that pay on an ad call basis.
For offers that pay based on user responses, divide the per-
ad call charge by the estimated response rate to compute a
per-response charge.
This section applied VCG pricing to portfolio allocations
without uncertainty and using standard portfolio allocation
notation. Appendix A applies VCG pricing with uncer-
tainty, following the notation in [2].
4. PROPERTIES AND CONNECTION TO SEC-
OND PRICES
The mechanism developed in Section 3 is efficient if bidders
report their true valuations, since the mechanism maximizes
the sum of reported valuations. This section begins with a
proof that the mechanism is truthful. Next we show that it is
individually rational, meaning that each buyer receives non-
negative value from participation. Then we outline a con-
nection between the mechanism’s prices and second prices.
4.1 Truthfulness
This subsection shows that bidding one’s own value is the
optimal strategy for each of the n bidders. The utility de-
rived from participation in the auction for bidder i, denoted
ui, is the difference between the bidder’s value for the allo-
cation received and the bidder’s payment. In other words,
ui(w) = wiµi − pi. (25)
If all bidders their true valuations µ, then the allocation is
w
∗. So the utility for bidder i is
ui(w
∗) = w∗i µi − [hi(v−i)− (w
∗T
µ− qw∗TΣw∗ − w∗i µi)]
(26)
= −hi(v−i) +w
∗T
µ− qw∗TΣw∗. (27)
Now suppose bidder i decides to bid vi = µi +∆ instead of
µi, while all other bidders bid their true valuations. Then
the portfolio allocation uses µ(∆) = (µ1, ..., µi−1, µi+∆, µi+1, ..., µn),
to produce an allocation w∆. So
ui(w
∆) (28)
= w∆i µi−[hi(v−i)−(w
∆T
µ(∆)−qw∆TΣw∆−w∆i (µi+∆))]
(29)
= w∆i µi−[hi(v−i)−(w
∆T
µ+w∆i ∆−qw
∆T
Σw
∆−w∆i (µi+∆))]
(30)
= −hi(v−i) +w
∆T
µ− qw∆TΣw∆ (31)
Note that hi(v−i) is independent of vi, so it cancels out in
the difference between ui(w
∗) and ui(w
∆), leaving:
ui(w
∗)− ui(w
∆) (32)
= [w∗Tµ− qw∗TΣw∗]− [w∆Tµ− qw∆TΣw∆] ≥ 0, (33)
the last inequality following by definition of w∗.
4.2 Individual Rationality
Now consider whether the mechanism is individually ratio-
nal for the n bidders. Since w∗ is chosen from the set
Γ = {w : wT1 = 1,w ≥ 0}, we must have the maximized
value of the objective at least as large as when w is chosen
from the set Γ with the additional restriction that wi = 0.
So:
w
∗T
µ− qw∗TΣw∗ ≥ [ max
{w:wT 1=1,w≥0,wi=0}
w
T
µ− qwTΣw].
(34)
Thus, the expected payoff for advertiser i from participating
in the auction is nonnegative.
4.3 Convergence to Second Prices
To see a connection with a second-price mechanism, consider
what happens when q = 0, indicating that the publisher is
risk-neutral. In this case, w∗i = 1 for the offer i having
the greatest µi. (For simplicity, assume the maximum is
unique). So all ad calls are awarded to the offer having the
highest expected revenue. The price for the winning offer i
is:
max
{w:wT 1=1,w≥0,wi=0}
w
T
µ, (35)
which is simply the expected revenue from awarding all ad
calls to the second-highest bidder. The price for the other
offers is zero, and the price for the publisher’s (lack of) risk
aversion is zero.
5. DISCUSSION
This paper describes a VCG mechanism to set prices for
online advertisers under portfolio allocations for risk-averse
publishers. The basic idea is to introduce an extra par-
ticipant that represents the publisher’s risk aversion. Then
the generalized VCG outcome selection method matches the
portfolio allocation method, and the VCG pricing method
reduces prices for advertisers who reduce publisher risk.
The basic idea can be generalized to introduce “social costs”
or “future costs” into the VCG mechanism. For example,
when a government allocates bandwidth among telecommu-
nications companies, the government’s goals may include
raising revenue and limiting howmuch bandwidth is awarded
to any single company, in order to maintain competition.
The market-maker could introduce an extra participant, with
valuations based on how much competition remains after
allocations. Applying the general VCG mechanism could
maximize an objective function that balances revenue for
the government with competition among bandwidth owners
after the allocation, reducing prices for bandwidth buyers
who maintain competition.
For online advertising, one direction for future work is to
introduce valuations for factors such as the value of learning
response rates and the value of ad impact on user expe-
rience. The value of learning is based on the probability
that showing an ad will lead to learning that it has a high
enough response rate to warrant allocating more ad calls
to it in the future, increasing future publisher revenue, as
discussed by Li, Mahdian, and McAfee [14]. (Learning also
reduces uncertainty about response rate, decreasing future
risk to publisher revenue.) Ad impact on user experience is
important because a publisher who shows high-revenue, but
disturbing, ads may drive away users, reducing future ad
calls and revenue, as explained by Abrams and Schwarz [1].
Likewise, ads that users appreciate may spur users to visit
websites more often and to recommend them to friends. For
both the value of learning and the value of ad impact on user
experience, the expected net present value and variance may
be estimated, but with some uncertainty. So these factors
may be included in the revenue and variance inputs to the
portfolio allocation model.
Several estimation correction methods have been proposed
for portfolio allocation in financial markets. It would be in-
teresting to explore how using these methods for online ad-
vertising markets would affect allocations and VCG prices.
These methods include James-Stein and other shrinkage meth-
ods (see Bock [3], Brown [4], Stein [22], and James and
Stein [9]), empirical Bayes estimation (see Jorion [11]), other
methods to correct for uncertainty (see Jobson, Korkie, and
Ratti [10] and Vasicek [27]), and robust optimization meth-
ods (see Scherer [19, 20], and Tutuncu [24]).
Another direction for future work is to accomodate more
complex bidding behavior, including allowing advertisers to
set budgets or, more generally, to express varying marginal
values for fractions of the allocation. If advertisers express
budget constraints in terms of a limit on the fraction of
ad calls they will accept, then these constraints translate
directly into linear constraints in the quadratic program to
solve for the portfolio allocation. Also, the VCG pricing
mechanism remains the same, with the limits on fractions of
allocations included in the specification of the feasible set of
outcomes A.
However, if the advertisers express budgets in terms of limits
on money to be spent, a few complications may arise. One
complication is that the VCG prices depend on the alloca-
tions, so the market-maker cannot simply convert a spending
limit for an advertiser into a limit on the fraction of ad calls
allocated to the advertiser. So an iterative procedure may be
required. Another complication is that if advertisers pay per
response, then the number of responses that will be realized
per ad call is not known when the ad calls are allocated.
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APPENDIX
A. APPLYING VCG PRICING TO QMAP
We will apply the generalized VCGmechanism to the QMAP
problem from Bax, Chitrapura, Garg, and Gopalakrishnan
[2]:
min
k
k
T
Ak+ bTk− qcTk. (36)
where A and b express uncertainty and randomness, and c
expresses expected returns. Please refer to [2] for details.
Transform to an equivalent problem by substituting 1/q for
q, multiplying by q, and reversing the signs:
max
k
c
T
k− q(kTAk+ bTk). (37)
Then
A = {k : kT1 = m,k ≥ 0}, (38)
where m is the number of available ad calls (The allocations
k are in terms of number of ad calls, rather than the fraction
of ad calls in allocations w). Also:
∀i ∈ 1, ....., n : vi(k) = ciki, (39)
since ci is the expected revenue per ad call. For the risk-
aversion participant,
vn+1(k) = −q(k
T
Ak+ bTk). (40)
So the allocation is
k
∗ = argmax
{k:kT 1=m,k≥0}
c
T
k− q(kTAk+ bTk), (41)
and the offer prices are
∀i ∈ 1, ....., n : (42)
pi = [ max
{k:kT 1=m,k≥0,ki=0}
c
T
k− q(kTAk+ bTk)] (43)
− [cTk∗ − q(k∗TAk∗ + bTk∗)]. (44)
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